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Notes & Comments
Collateral Attacks Upon Class Action
Judgments: Ending the Scope of
Review Debate By Addressing the
Underlying Notice Problems.
INTRODUCTION
In deciding Lamarque v. Fairbanks in July 2007 the Rhode
Island Supreme Court faced two troublesome issues in class action
civil procedure. 1 The first issue was what scope of review a court
should apply when an absentee class member collaterally attacks
a class action judgment entered by a foreign court in order to
escape its binding effect. In other words, if an absentee class
member contends that he or she should not be bound by the first
judgment for lack of due process, should a court examine the
merits of that claim, as it would if a plaintiff in an individual suit
collaterally attacked on personal jurisdiction grounds the
judgment of another court? Or should the court give full faith and
credit to the foreign court's judgment and limit review to a
determination of whether there were adequate safeguards in place
to ensure procedural due process? The second and underlying
issue, which the court avoided confronting as a result of its ruling
on the first, is what the standards are in a class action suit
certified under Rule 23(b)(3) 2 for determining whether the notice
to absentee class members satisfies Federal Rule of Civil
1. Lamarque v. Fairbanks, Capital Corp., 927 A.2d 753 (R.I. 2007).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) applies to class action suits seeking solely or
predominantly money damages. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 811 n.3 (1985).
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Procedure 23(c)(2)(B) 3 and due process requirements laid down by
the Supreme Court.
On the first issue in Lamarque the Rhode Island Supreme
court joined the ranks of courts favoring the more narrow scope of
review that looks only to the procedures of the foreign court and
not to the merits of the absentee class member's grievance. 4 The
court thus barred the plaintiffs 5 illegal foreclosure, breach of
implied contract not to foreclose, and deceptive trade practices
claims. 6
The plaintiff had sued loan servicer Fairbanks when
Fairbanks foreclosed on her property in 2001 after allegedly
refusing her tenders of payment, continually changing the amount
due, failing to explain charges, and advising her that foreclosure
would not be initiated until January 2002. 7 Subsequent to her
filing suit, a class action in Massachusetts was initiated that
made "almost identical" allegations as those made by the
Lamarque plaintiff.8 However, although the Lamarque plaintiff
fit within the criteria for identifying those to whom individual
notice would be sent, she was never sent notice of the class action
suit or the settlement. 9
Moreover, months before the requests for exclusion from the
class action were due from the class members who were mailed
notice, the class action court ordered a preliminary injunction that
prohibited class members from commencing any suit against
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) states in part that "[flor any class certified
under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort."
4. Lamarque, 927 A.2d at 753.
5. Initially, the suit was filed by both Kathy Lamarque and her ex-
husband Andre Lamarque, who jointly owned the property. The relationship
with Fairbanks stemmed from the Lamarques' refinancing of the property to
help fund their son's college education. Id. at 755. Although Kathy had
moved to Texas at the time of the refinance, Andre continued to live at the
jointly owned property. Id. at 755 nn.2-3. However, because Andre did not
appeal the grant of summary judgment and thus was not a party to the case
decided by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, I will refer to Kathy alone as
the "Lamarque plaintiff." Id. at 756.
6. Id. at 754-55.
7. Id. at 755-56, 757 n.12.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 755, 760 n.16.
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Fairbanks. 10  Fairbanks could have moved to dismiss the
Lamarque plaintiffs suit immediately after the granting of the
preliminary injunction, which would have given her actual notice
of the class action and the right to opt out and pursue her claim
independently. 11 However, it "instead waited until ... long after
the opt-out deadline ... to move for summary judgment based on
res judicata."12 Her notice of the class action suit thus came four
months after a settlement agreement was reached and judgment
entered by the United States District Court in Massachusetts,
when Fairbanks moved for summary judgment in her suit. 13
The Lamarque plaintiff appealed the granting of the
summary judgment motion on the grounds that she had been
deprived adequate notice and thus due process of law. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court expressed its "very grave concerns about
why Kathy Lamarque was not sent individual notice" and felt
"compelled to question the way that defendant and defendant's
counsel . . . handled plaintiffs conundrum regarding the
preclusive effect of the [class action] suit. ' 14 With regard to the
time sequence of the preliminary injunction enjoining the
commencement of any suits by class members, the court termed
Fairbanks's and defense counsel's actions "questionable if not
odious." 15  It further noted that such timing "may well be a
strange coincidence, but if it [was] the product of strategy, th[at]
series of events is indicative of sharp and unseemly practice and
falls woefully short of what this court expects of attorneys who
practice in this jurisdiction." 16
Nonetheless, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that its
scope of review was restricted to a determination of whether there
were sufficient procedural safeguards in place in the class action
suit to protect the due process rights of absentee class members
rather than a reexamination of the United States District Court's
decision that the notice was adequate. 17 Because the court found
10. Id. at 767 n.27.
11. Id.
12. Lamarque, 927 A.2d at 767 n.27.
13. Id. at 756.
14. Id. at 766-67, nn.26-27.
15. Id. at 767 n.27.
16. Id.
17. Lamarque, 927 A.2d at 765.
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that the procedural safeguards in the class action suit were
adequate, the District Court's approval of the notice to class
members was determinative. 1 8 Lamarque's due process for lack of
adequate notice challenge thus failed and her suit to recover for
wrongful foreclosure on her property was barred.
The factual circumstances of Lamarque, about which the
court itself expressed its discomfort, exemplify a broader problem
of inadequate protection of absentee class members' due process
right to notice. The system for approving notice procedures is no
longer adversarial because neither class counsel nor defendants
have incentive to enforce stringent notice requirements. 19 In
addition, especially when the suit is on the track to settlement,
the presiding court has little incentive to overturn notice
procedures agreed to by opposing parties. 20 Thus, the debate
surrounding the proper scope of review of a collateral attack arises
because, with no one enforcing stringent notice requirements,
courts must make an uncomfortable choice: when an absentee
class member who was never notified of the class action suit turns
up, courts must either second guess the certifying court's
adequacy of notice determination or bar the claims of plaintiffs
despite the fact that the approved notice method did not achieve
its objective of notifying the absentee class member.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the collateral attack
debate and conclude that inadequate and unclear standards for
determining what constitutes adequate notice in the first place is
the impetus for the debate. Part III will discuss the notice
standards prescribed by the United States Supreme Court and
Rule 23(c)(2)(B), the questions left open by the broad language of
the standard, and the resulting lenient interpretations that
18. Id. at 765-66.
19. See Darren Carter, Note, Notice and the Protection of Class Members'
Interests, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1126-27 (1996) (suggesting that "[tihe
plaintiffs' attorney, who brought suit and asserted class standing in the first
place, obviously has no incentive to derail the settlement process... Likewise,
the defense attorney, with whom the enforcement responsibility for most of
Rule 23's provisions principally lies, has no incentive to object since
certification and maintenance are needed to obtain res judicata on the class
as a whole").
20. See id. at 1127 (suggesting that the "policy of federal courts to
encourage settlement precludes any true inquiry into the certification and
maintenance requirements if a voluntary, negotiated settlement has already
been reached").
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provide inadequate protection to class members' right to receive
notice of the adjudication of their rights. Part IV will discuss the
systemic problems resulting from the lenient notice standards,
and Part V will recommend measures to remedy these problems,
to afford greater protection to class members' right to notice, and
to make unnecessary the debate regarding the proper scope of
review when a class action judgment is collaterally attacked on
inadequate notice grounds.
II. THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF A FOREIGN COURT'S JUDGMENT ON AN
ABSENTEE CLASS MEMBER AND THE PROPER SCOPE OF REVIEW OF A
COURT REVIEWING A COLLATERAL ATTACK.
The history of the debate surrounding the proper scope of
review of a collateral attack on a class action judgment begins
with two United States Supreme Court decisions: one related to
the issue of collateral attack, and the other to the issue of
absentee class members' due process rights.
In Hansberry v. Lee, the Supreme Court entertained
defendants' collateral attack on lack of due process grounds upon
an earlier class action judgment, and held that absentee class
members "may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact
adequately represented by parties who are present. ' 21 Based on
its finding that the defendants in the case before it were not
adequately represented, because their interests in resisting
enforcement of the racially restrictive land use agreement were in
conflict with the class representative in the prior suit who sought
enforcement of the same agreement, the Court found that "the
procedure and course of litigation" in the class action suit did not
satisfy the due process requirement of adequate representation. 22
Subsequently, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Court
expanded the due process requirements beyond adequate
representation for class actions certified under 23(b)(3), which
"concernU claims wholly or predominately for money
judgments." 23 The Court found that the "minimal procedural due
21. 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940).
22. Id. at 44-46.
23. 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985). For an explanation of the development
and rationale behind the distinctions between 23(b)(1), (2), and (3) classes, see
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356,
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process protection" required that an absentee class member
plaintiff "receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and
participate in the litigation" and "an opportunity to remove
himself from the class by executing and returning an opt out
request for exclusion form to the court," and that "the named
plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the
absent class members. '24 Thus after Shutts a collateral attack
based on lack of due process, which was authorized by Hansberry,
can have grounds other than inadequate representation.
The landscape at which the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
looking when it decided Lamarque included, on the one hand,
courts that had ruled that Hansberry stands for a limited scope of
review when a class action suit is collaterally attacked and that
Shutts did not expand the scope. For instance, in Epstein v. MCA,
Inc., relied on by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Lamarque,
when class members argued to the Ninth Circuit that lack of due
process as a result of inadequate representation precluded a
Delaware Supreme Court's entry of judgment in a concurrent class
action from binding them, the court found that Shutts "d[id] not
support the broad collateral review" required for it to examine the
merits of that argument. 25 Noting that the Hansberry Court only
examined whether the procedures adopted were adequate, the
court held that due process required only that "an absent class
member's right to adequate representation be protected by the
adoption of the appropriate procedures by the certifying court and
by the courts that review its determinations; due process [did] not
require collateral second-guessing of those determinations and
that review."26  Thus, the court seemed to suggest that the
"appropriate procedures" are only a finding by the class certifying
court that the Rule 23 criteria were satisfied. 27 Because the
Delaware court "made the requisite findings" that "the settlement
386-94 (1967).
24. Hansberry, 472 U.S. at 812. In addition, the Court adopted the notice
standard requiring that notice must be 'the best practicable, reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections."' Id. (quoting Mullane v. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314-15 (1950)).
25. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1999).
26. Id. at 648.
27. Id. at 647 n.6.
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was 'fair, reasonable, adequate and in the best interests of the...
Settlement class,"' that "notice to the class was 'in full compliance
with .. .the requirements of the process' and that the plaintiffs
"fairly and adequately protected the interests of the Settlement
Class," the judgment was therefore "protected from a collateral
attack. '28  Although the Epstein decision was appealed, the
United States Supreme Court declined review. 29
The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth
Circuit, and in Hospitality Management Associates v. Shell Oil
Co., which the Lamarque court also relied on, it held that "the
proper scope of collateral review of a rendering court's rulings on
the due process requirements for binding absent class members is
one limited to a consideration of whether the procedures in the
prior litigation allowed a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
due process issues."30  In arriving at its decision, the court
examined "important policy considerations favoring both limited
and broad collateral review," and concluded that "the significant
interests in efficiency and finality," as well as the "spirit of full
faith and credit" outweighed the possibility of enforcing "class
action settlement against parties over whom the rendering court
did not have personal jurisdiction." 3 1 The court therefore limited
its review to a determination of "whether there were safeguards in
place to guarantee sufficient notice and adequate representation"
and "whether such safeguards were, in fact, applied. '32 The
United States Supreme Court again declined to grant certiorari to
address the proper scope of review. 33
On the other hand, the landscape of precedent from other
jurisdictions for the Lamarque court to reference also included
decisions from courts that held that Hansberry does not require
such a limited scope of review. In Stephenson v. Dow Chemical
Co., the only case the Lamarque court's decision referred to that
adopted the broad scope of review, the Second Circuit declined to
28. Id.
29. Epstein v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 528 U.S. 1004 (1999).
30. Hospitality Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 591 S.E.2d 611, 623
(S.C. 2004). The Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on both Epstein and
Hospitality Management in Lamarque. Lamarque, 927 A.2d at 765.
31. Hospitality Mgmt., 591 S.E.2d at 659-60.
32. Id. at 619.
33. Hospitality Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 543 U.S. 916 (2004).
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adopt Epstein's limited scope of review and examined the merits of
the plaintiffs' inadequate representation argument. 34  The
plaintiffs in Stephenson were Vietnam veterans who sued for
compensation for injuries resulting from exposure to Agent
Orange which did not manifest themselves until 1996 and 1998,
when each was diagnosed with cancer. 35 The defendant claimed
the actions were barred by a 1984 class action settlement that
included in the class veterans whose injuries had not yet
manifested and also provided that the funds from the settlement
award would not be paid out for death or disability occurring after
1994.36 The plaintiffs contended that their interests were
inadequately represented in the class action and that binding
them would therefore violate their due process rights. 37
The court declined to follow the Epstein decision but found
that the plaintiffs' collateral attack was allowed under its
standard because no court had "addressed specifically the
adequacy of representation for those members of the class whose
injuries manifested after depletion of the settlement funds" and
thus, there had been "no prior determination of the absent class
members rights."38 The court further found that the propriety of a
collateral attack on a class action judgment was supported by
Hansberry, Shutts and other circuit court decisions and that "such
collateral review would not . . . violate defendants' due process
rights by exposing them to double liability [because e]xposure to
liability . . . is not duplicative if plaintiffs were never proper
parties to the prior judgment in the first place."39 Although the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, in a per curiam
opinion it simply vacated and remanded the Second Circuit's
judgment with respect to some plaintiffs and affirmed Second
Circuit's judgment with respect to others. 40
34. 273 F.3d 249, 258 (2d Cir. 2001). The court noted, however that
"plaintiffs' collateral attack is proper even under [Epstein's] standard." Id.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court consulted Stephenson in Lamarque but
found Epstein and Hospitality Management more persuasive. Lamarque, 927
A.2d at 763-65.
35. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 255.
36. Id. at 253-54.
37. Id. at 257.
38. Id. at 257-58.
39. Id. at 258-59.
40. Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
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In Vermont v. Homeside Lending Inc., another case adopting
the broad scope of review but not referenced by the Lamarque
court, the Vermont Supreme Court was "inclined to follow the ...
decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Stephenson"
when it determined the question of the proper scope of review of a
collateral attack upon a class action judgment entered by a foreign
court.4 1 The first class action, which was claimed to bar the
Homeside Lending suit, arose when Bank of Boston forced
mortgagees to keep more money in their escrow accounts than was
required by their contracts and did not pay them interest on these
amounts. 42 Bank of Boston was thus "getting the use of the
mortgagees' money for free."'4 3
Because it felt the attorneys' fees proposed by the bank were
too low, class counsel rejected the bank's initial offer to release the
excess money and separately pay attorney fees. 4 4 Instead, class
counsel negotiated a settlement that included much larger
attorney fees, but provided that these fees would be paid not by
the bank, but from the escrow accounts the bank would release. 4 5
The result was that class members had to pay attorney fees out of
escrow money that was never lost to them, nor "recovered" by
class counsel. 46 It had always been held by the bank in the
customers' own names; the dispute was over the interest owed. 4 7
"What this meant for some absent class members was that some
piddling figure, representing back interest, was deposited in their
escrow accounts and a much greater figure was deducted to pay
attorneys' fees. All those absent class members ended up poorer
for having settled their claims against the bank." 48
The Vermont Attorney General sued BancBoston and
41. Vermont v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1017 (Vt. 2003).
42. See Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class
Members Denied Adequate Representation, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1787,
1809 (2004).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1809-10.
47. Id.
48. See Koniak, supra note 42, at 1810-11. In addition, even customers
who had not had excess escrow money held were charged attorneys' fees, and
thus, some class members "got $0 in recovery and paid sometimes over $100
in attorneys' fees." Id.
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Homeside Lending, Inc., the successor to the bank's mortgage
business, who in turn claimed that the action was barred because
all the absent class members were bound by the earlier
settlement. 49 The court entertained the collateral attack and
found that the both the notice sent to the absent class members
and the representation afforded them by class counsel was
inadequate. 50 The notice did not "comport with due process"
because it failed to include "the one essential fact" that "some,
many, or all of the absent class members were actually in a
defendant class because their attorney's fee exposure, under the
fee requested by class counsel, exceeded their economic benefit. '' 51
The court further found that the class representatives had not
adequately represented the absent class members because their
economic interest in an additional payment they would receive
under the settlement terms "required them to support the
settlement irrespective of how it treated any [absent] class
member."52  In addition, the court held that class counsel's
representation was inadequate because its fees "took away most or
all of the economic benefit of the litigation for class members. '53
The court went on to say, however, that even if it were to
subscribe to the view that the test is limited to a determination
whether the adequacy of notice and representation was fully
litigated in the foreign court, that would not preclude collateral
attack in the instant case where hearings were "not
adversarial." 54 The court noted that "[t]here was no contest over
the class notice, and the [first class action] court simply accepted
it as proposed jointly by class counsel and defendants without
analysis."55  The first class action judge's decision had simply
reiterated "[w]ithout any analysis or specificity" that "the notice
complied with all requirements of due process" and did not
directly address the adequacy of representation issue.56 Thus, the
court approved the collateral attack on the alternate ground of
lack of adverseness in the prior proceedings.
49. Id. at 1814.
50. Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1018.
51. Id. at 1011.
52. Id. at 1013.
53. Id. at 1016.
54. Id. at 1018.
55. Id. at 1018-19.
56. Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1018.
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Thus was the landscape when Lamarque came before the
Rhode Island Supreme Court. Lamarque involved a plaintiff that
filed suit in Rhode Island state court in January 2002 alleging
illegal foreclosure, breach of an implied contract not to foreclose,
and use of deceptive trade practices. 57  In early 2003,
unbeknownst to the Lamarque plaintiff, Curry v. Fairbanks
Capital Corp., a class action making substantially the same
allegations against the same defendant as in Lamarque, was filed
in federal district court in Massachusetts. 58 In accordance with
the notice procedures in Curry, the defendant was to use its
"readily searchable computer media" to prepare a list of class
members, all of whom would be mailed individual notice. 59
Although the Lamarque plaintiff fell "squarely within the class as
defined and certified" by the Curry court, she was inexplicably not
sent individual notice of the class action suit.60
In May 2004, after approving a settlement agreement, the
Curry court entered a final judgment dismissing the claims of all
class members with prejudice. 61 Four months later, the defendant
moved for summary judgment in Lamarque on the grounds that as
member of the class in Curry, the plaintiffs claim was barred by
res judicata and release. 62 The court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed claiming
among other things that she was not bound by the judgment in
the Curry suit because she had never received notice of the suit or
the settlement. 63
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was thus presented with
the question of what the proper scope of review is when reviewing
collateral attack upon a class action judgment entered by a foreign
court. 64 The grounds upon which the collateral attack was based,
57. Lamarque, 927 A.2d at 755.
58. Id. at 755, 757 n.12.
59. Id. at 765 n.22.
60. Id. at 758, 766 n.26. In expressing its "grave concerns" over why she
was not sent individual notice, the court noted that "[s]he was listed as a
borrower on the same mortgage as Andre Lamarque, and it [was] undisputed
that he was mailed individual notice." Id. The court does not explain why
Andre apparently did not mention the notice he received to his ex-wife Kathy.
61. Id. at 755-56.
62. Id. at 756.
63. Lamarque, 927 A.2d at 756.
64. Id. at 760.
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however, differed from the cases discussed above. The plaintiff in
Lamarque did not attack the prior judgment on inadequacy of
representation grounds, nor was her dispute with the adequacy of
the contents of the notice. 65 Rather, her challenge was that the
notice distribution method described below was inadequate
because she was never mailed notice or otherwise notified. 66
After examining the decisions in Epstein, Hospitality
Management, and Stephenson,67 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
found the reasoning of the Epstein and Hospitality Management
courts more persuasive and thus adopted the more limited scope of
collateral review. 68 The court agreed with the Ninth Circuit and
South Carolina Supreme Court that "[a]llowing broad collateral
attacks on final judgments entered in class action suits would...
undermine the important goals of efficiency and finality in which
the class action law suit finds its genesis." 69
The court therefore limited its review to whether there were
"safeguards in place to guarantee sufficient notice" and "whether
such safeguards were, in fact, applied. ' 70 The notice method
prescribed by the Curry court order mandated that the defendant
compile a list of class members from its databank and check the
list against the National Change of Address database. 71  In
addition, Class Counsel was responsible for mailing the notice to
the individuals on the list and re-mailing it to any forward
address provided the first mailing was returned. 72 Summary
notice was also published twice in USA Today. 73 The Lamarque
court recited these procedures, noted that the "notices were
appropriately drafted and adequately notified class members of
the existence of the suit and settlement, the types of claims
covered by it, and the right to opt out of the suit, including
instructions and deadline" and thus decided that there were
"adequate safeguards in place" in Curry "to guarantee sufficient
65. Id. at 765 n.21.
66. Id. at 759-60, 760 n.16.
67. The court did not discuss or reference Homeside Lending.
68. Id. at 765.
69. Lamarque, 972 A.2d. at 765.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 765 n.22.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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notice to all class members." 74 In addition, the Lamarque court
concluded that that the "propriety of the notice procedures ... was
fully and fairly litigated" by the Curry court and the notice was
adequate because after a fairness hearing in Curry75 that court
"held that the notice procedure it had ordered had been complied
with and that [it] was the best notice practicable under the
circumstances and satisfie[d] the requirements of due process." 76
The court's holding in Lamarque highlights two problems
with the limited scope of review for collateral attacks upon a class
action judgment. The first is that there is no clear standard for
determining either what constitutes adequate safeguards or
compliance therewith. For instance, as noted above, it is unclear
what standards the court was applying when it concluded that the
Curry court "had adequate safeguards in place"; after stating this
legal conclusion, the court simply recited all of the procedures that
the Curry court employed. 77  The court neither referred to
objective criteria nor cited any authority that found similar
procedures adequate and there was thus no indication of when, if
ever, a court reviewing the notice procedure employed by a foreign
court would find it inadequate. 78
Determination of whether adequacy of notice was fully and
fairly litigated in the court rendering judgment in the class action
suit also does not provide an objective standard. On the one hand,
the Homeside Lending court stated that full and fair litigation
means that the adequacy of notice issue has been exposed to the
74. Id. at 765-66.
75. The Lamarque court did not have the transcript from the fairness
hearing. 972 A.2d. at 766.
76. Id. at 765-66.
77. Id.
78. The court did note that "plaintiff might have been able to avoid the
effect of the Curry judgment if she had demonstrated either that the order
itself was defective because it was inadequately drafted to insure that due
process would be afforded to all class members, or that [defendant] failed to
appropriately follow the instructions of the [Curry] court, thus undercutting
the protections embodied in the order." Id. at 766 n.25. However, the
plaintiffs grievance was not with the drafting of the notice because she never
received it. Rather, her grievance was with the adequacy of the distribution
of the notice, and it seems curious that despite the fact that according to the
court ordered procedures the plaintiff should have been mailed notice, the
fact that she was not was not evidence that defendant "failed to appropriately
follow the instructions of the [Curry] court." Id.
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adversarial process, rather than addressed by a judge's conclusory
statement "[w]ithout any analysis or specificity" that the notice
"complied with all requirements of due process. ' 79 On the other
hand, despite not knowing what actually transpired at the
fairness hearing, the Lamarque court was satisfied that such a
hearing had been held and was comfortable relying on the fact
that the Curry court had summarily held, without analysis, that
the notice procedure had been complied with and satisfied due
process.8 0
Thus, the limited scope of review does not provide clear
standards by which a defendant can ensure a foreign court
reviewing a collateral attack upon a class action judgment will
find that the notice procedure was adequate and that it was
complied with, nor does the limited scope of review provide clear
standards to plaintiffs as to what they must show in order to
mount a successful collateral attack.
The second problem with the limited scope of review that the
LaMarque decision highlights is the seemingly unjust and
unsettling results such a limited review may lead to. As discussed
above in the Introduction, the court expressed "very grave
concerns about why [plaintiff] was not sent individual notice in
the Curry suit."81 It noted that rather than moving to dismiss the
Lamarque suit immediately after the granting of the preliminary
injunction enjoining actions by class members, which would have
notified the plaintiff of the class action and her right to opt out,
defense counsel "instead waited until . . . long after the opt-out
deadline . . . to move for summary judgment based on res
judicata."8 2 Despite recognizing the "harsh result of its decision,"
and finding "defendant's, and defense counsel's, actions
questionable if not odious," the court stated that inquiry into the
merits of the plaintiffs claim were "well beyond the bounds of the
narrow scope of review" it found proper. 83  The court thus
proclaimed its hands tied and referred the plaintiff to the court
that rendered the Curry judgment.8 4
79. Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1018-19.
80. Lamarque, 927 A.2d at 766.
81. Id. at 766 n.26.
82. Id. at 767 n.27.
83. Id. at 766-67 n.27.
84. Id. at 766-67.
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I propose that these two problems are rooted in, and
symptoms of, the flawed standards for determining what
constitutes adequate notice being applied by the courts rendering
the class action judgments. A collateral review of these
determinations highlights this problem because it gives us a
"Monday morning quarterback" view of the injustice resulting
from inadequate, but court sanctioned, notice procedures. The
resulting tension between courts that emphasize the importance
of finality and full faith and credit, and those that cannot stand to
see such injustice go uncorrected, would not exist were it not for
the underlying flaws in adequate notice standards.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD FOR ADEQUATE NOTICE, THE
QUESTIONS THE BROAD LANGUAGE LEFT OPEN, AND THE LENIENT
INTERPRETATIONS RESULTING.
There are very few Rhode Island state court cases discussing
notice in the context of class actions. The few cases there are were
decided when the Rhode Island Rule of Civil Procedure 23 differed
substantially from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in not
requiring individual notice and a right to opt out, which is no
longer the case 85 Thus, when certification was at issue rather
than due process, the courts applied a standard that is now not
applicable. In addition, each time a Rhode Island court has
discussed notice to class members in the context of due process
requirements, the court has referenced standards laid down by the
United States Supreme Court or a Federal District Court.8 6 For
85. See Testa v. City of Providence, 572 A.2d 1336, 1338 n.2 (R.I. 1990);
Guadagno v. Hertz Corp., No. C.A. 79-398, 1983 WL 481447, *1 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Mar. 1, 1983); Holmes v. Citizens Bank, No. C.A. 81-2625, 1983 WL
486830, *5-6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 1983); Rhode Island Rule 23(c)(2) now
requires, as Federal Rule 23(c)(2)(B) does, that for class actions maintained
under 23(b)(3) the court must "direct to the members of the class the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice the all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort" and that the notice
shall advise that "the court will exclude the member from the class if the
member so requests by a specified date." R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
86. See Guadagno, 1983 WL 481447, at *5 ("The Court must ensure that
due process obligations to absent members are fulfilled. The United States
Supreme Court has held that personal service by mail is required where
names and addresses of members of the class are ascertainable"); Holmes,
1983 WL 486830, at *10 ("we also agree fully with the [Unite States
Supreme] [C]ourt's ruling in Eisen that due process requires decent notice.").
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these reasons, the discussion of the establishment of adequate
notice standards and their subsequent application will reference
decisions from the United States Supreme Court and courts
outside of Rhode Island.
The standard for what constitutes adequate notice as required
by due process was established by the United States Supreme
Court and later incorporated in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Almost sixty years ago, in Mullane v. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., the Supreme Court discussed the standards for the notice a
party is entitled to receive under the Due Process Clause, which
required "at a minimum . . . notice and [an] opportunity for [a]
hearing."87  The Court recognized that "[a]n elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which
is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections."88  The Court further held that notice by mail was
required for individuals whose name and address was known, but
notice by publication was sufficient for individuals who were
unknown.89
Rule 23(c)(2), which echoed Mullane's notice standards,
emerged from the 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Rule provided that for actions maintained under
23(b)(3), "the court shall direct to the members of the class the
best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort."90
Eight years later the United States Supreme Court discussed
the individual notice requirement of 23(c)(2)(B) in Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin.91 The Court reaffirmed that "individual notice to
87. 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Mullane involved the defendant bank's
settlement of a fund comprised of 113 trusts and the question of whether the
notice provided to the trust beneficiaries in accordance with state statutory
provisions satisfied due process guarantees. Id. at 309-11. Although it was
not a class action suit, it raised similar issues with regards to adequacy of
notice.
88. Id. at 315.
89. Id.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(2)(B).
91. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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identifiable class members [was] not a discretionary
consideration," and that "each class member who [could] be
identified through reasonable effort must be notified that he may
request exclusion from the action and thereby preserve his
opportunity to press his claim separately."92
Under Mullane, Rule 23(c)(2), and Eisen therefore, notice
must be reasonably calculated to notify class members, and such
reasonably calculated notice includes individual notice to
reasonably identifiable class members. Such broad language,
however, leaves substantial room for interpreting what satisfies
due process. The least demanding and least protective of absentee
class members' right to notice standard has since generally
prevailed.
For instance, one question resulting from the broad language
of Mullane, Eisen, and Rule 23(c)(2)(B) is whether individual
notice must be given or merely attempted. On the one hand,
Mullane found that the notice is not inadequate "because in fact it
fail[ed] to reach everyone," and must be only that "reasonably
calculated" to apprise the parties of the litigation and "afford them
an opportunity to present their objections." 93 On the other hand,
there are indications that actual notice might be important. For
instance, in Shutts, 1,500 class members were excluded even
though individual notice was sent to them, "because the notice and
opt out form was undeliverable." 94 If all that were required was
to mail notice to these class members then it would seem that it
was unnecessary to exclude them from the class. Also, the Eisen
Court referred to individual notice as mandatory and repeated the
mantra that it "must" be "given" or "provided."95  However, in
reference to the identifiable class members in that case, the Court
noted that "there [was] nothing to show that individual notice
[could] not be mailed to each," suggesting that it was the sending
and not the receipt of the notices that was the crucial factor. 96
Ultimately, despite the recitation of the individual notice
mantra, the "best practicable notice" principle has controlled the
standard for adequate notice, which now requires that individual
92. Id. at 176.
93. 339 U.S. at 315.
94. 472 U.S. at 813.
95. 417 U.S. at 176.
96. Id. Emphasis added.
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notice be attempted rather than given. 97 Courts have held that
notice was adequate even when it was known that class members
received individual notice after the opt out deadline or not at all. 98
And rather than excluding from the class those identifiable class
members that were known not to have received notice, as was
done in Shutts, these individuals were included in the class and
thus bound by the class action judgment.
Another question, and one which has not been so clearly
settled after Mullane, Rule 23(c)(2), and Eisen, is what constitutes
a reasonable effort to identify class members. If only class
members that are identifiable by reasonable efforts are due at
least an attempt at individual notice, how is this group of class
members identified? Although the Mullane Court referred to a
due diligence standard for ascertaining the name and
whereabouts of persons affected by a proceeding, it left open the
question of what investigative "searches might be required in
another situation" than the one involved there. 99 Rule 23(c)(2)
added no further clues, and in Eisen, although the trial court
found that 2,250,000 class members could be identified with
reasonable effort, it was unclear what standard of reasonable
effort was applied to reach this determination or why the
remaining 3,750,000 class members were not reasonably
97. See, e.g., Rigat v. GAF Materials Corp., No. CV010095029, 2002 WL
237339, at *3 (Conn. Super. Jan. 25, 2002) ("The Supreme Court says that
the plaintiff 'must receive notice.' But, 'must receive notice' does not mean or
require the plaintiff gets actual notice"'); Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454
(9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the court "[did] not believe that "Shutts changes
the traditional standard for class notice from 'best practicable' to 'actually
received' notice); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d
145, 168 (2d Cir. 1987) (disagreeing with the contention that Rule 23(c)(2)
requires actual notice to every class member).
98. See, e.g., Silber, 18 F.3d at 1451 (due process rights not violated even
though notice was not sent to at least 1,000 class members until after the opt
out deadline); DeJulius v. New England Health Care Employees Pension
Fund, 429 F.3d 935, 946 (10th Cir. 2005) (notice satisfied due process
requirements even though class members did not receive notice until after
the opt out deadline); Bussie v. Allmerica Financial Corp., 50 F.Supp.2d 59,
69 (D. Mass. 1999) (notice adequate even though 21,698 of notice packages
were undeliverable); In re The Prudential Insurance Company of America
Sales Practices Litigation, 177 F.R.D. 216, 223 (D. N.J. 1997) (notice
adequate even though after 100,000 notices returned undeliverable or non-
forwardable only 25,000 were able to be re-sent with updated addresses).
99. 339 U.S. at 317-18.
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identifiable. 100 On this subject, like that of notice given versus
notice attempted, subsequent courts have adopted a lenient
interpretation where a reasonable effort seems to include nothing
beyond retrieving an "easily accessible list."'10 1
Mullane, Eisen, and Rule 23(c)(2)(B) also left open the
question of what standard should be applied when determining
whether notice was reasonably calculated to reach the parties. 102
Mullane stated that "the means [of notice] must be such as one
desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it or, where conditions do not reasonably
permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less
likely to bring home notice than other of feasible and customary
substitutes."'1 3 Aside from this rather flexible language, Mullane
provided the narrow decree that notice through ordinary mail is
reasonably calculated to notify class members whose identity and
addresses are known, while notice by publication is sufficient for
unidentifiable class members. 104 The Federal Rules and Eisen did
not elaborate on the standard.
Even within the rule requiring individual notice by mail to
reasonably identifiable class members, however, courts have
chosen the more lax standards when determining whether the
mailing itself was reasonably calculated to reach its recipient.
Mailing to the last known address has been sufficient without
regard to whether the notice was returned undeliverable, 10 5 and
100. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(2)(B); 417 U.S. at 176-77.
101. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 169 (disagreeing with
contention that all veterans should have been sent notice, in part because
although "some records kept by the government would have facilitated
individualized notice ... there was no easily accessible list of veterans, as
there must have been of royalty holders in [Shutts] and of odd-lot trading
customers in [Eisen])"; In re The Prudential Insurance Company, 177 F.R.D.
at 223 ("Rule 23 does not require the parties to exhaust every conceivable
method of identifying the individual class members").
102. There has been more said on the separate issue of determining
whether the contents of the notice are reasonably calculated to inform the
parties of the suit and their rights. See, e.g., Todd B. Hilsee, Shannon R.
Wheatman & Gina M. Intrepido, Do You Really Want Me To Know My
Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process In Class Action Notice Is More Than
Just Plain Language: A Desire To Actually Inform, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1359 (2005).
103. 339 U.S. at 315.
104. Id. at 317-318.
105. See In re Chambers Development Securities Litigation, 912 F. Supp.
649
650 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:631
individual mailings that were sent out without a zip code or
apartment number have been deemed reasonably calculated to
reach class members. 106
In sum, where uncertainty exists in the standards set forth in
Mullane, Eisen and Rule 23(c)(2)(B), courts have chosen the more
lenient interpretation of what constitutes adequate notice:
reasonably identifiable class members are entitled only to notice
attempted rather than received, reasonable efforts to identify class
members seems to require only the production of an easily
attainable list, and notice is reasonably calculated to reach
members even when it displays an incorrect or incomplete
address.
IV. THE SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM LENIENT NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS
The leniency of the current requirements for notice to
absentee class members, which require very little for notice to be
deemed adequate, skews systemic safeguards that are in place in
non class action suits and provides inadequate protection of class
members' right to notification of adjudication of their interests.
For instance, one of the systemic safeguards in our judicial
system is the adversarial system, which reflects the "need to allow
individuals to protect and advance their own personal interests
through litigation" and recognizes that the "adjudicatory process
is most securely founded when it is exercised under the impact of
a lively conflict between antagonistic demands, actively
pressed."'10 7 The determination of the notice methods to be
employed in a class action, however, involve class representatives,
class counsel, and defendant, none of whom have incentive to
822, 836 (W.D. Pa. 1995).
106. See Peters v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d 1483,
1486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that Mullane-"endorsed first class mail as ...
notice reasonably calculated to reach reasonably identifiable parties," and
notice was adequate despite missing zip code and apartment number because
zip codes are optional, the omission was class counsel's not defendant's fault,
and it was not foreseeable to the parties responsible for the mailing that the
class member's New York City address required an apartment number").
107. See Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class
Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the
Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 549, 572 (2006).
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challenge the other party.1 0 8 On the one hand, the defendant
would prefer that as few class members as possible receive actual
notice because they will be bound, as explained above, with or
without actual notice. 10 9 The defendant will thus exert as little
effort as possible in identifying class members and in attempting
to reach them with actual notice. On the other hand, because the
class size remains the same whether or not actual notice is
received by class members, class counsel has little incentive to
improve notice methods. Moreover, the more class members
actually reached, the more potential objectors there are to any
settlement agreement, litigation strategies, or, more importantly,
attorney's fees. 110 Thus, there is no party naturally disposed to
advocate the interests of the absentee class members in receiving
the notice that due process is supposed to guarantee them; the
"essential safeguard" of the adversarial system is absent. 111
Another due process safeguard that is illusory in the context
of ensuring adequate notice to absentee class members is the
court's role in ensuring the Rules are followed and due process
requirements satisfied. It has been argued that "the policy of the
federal courts to encourage settlement precludes any true inquiry
into the certification and maintenance requirements if a
voluntary, negotiated settlement has already been reached. In
this intensely pro-settlement environment, the effectiveness of the
Rule 23 provisions that rely upon the courts and the parties'
attorneys for enforcement is significantly diluted."112
108. Although the Shutts court noted that the determination of whether
representation is adequate may remain adversarial, as explained below, the
same line of reasoning does not hold true in the context of notice procedures.
See 472 U.S. at 809-10 (noting defendant "has a great interest in ensuring
that the absent plaintiffs' claims are properly before the forum" and that the
defendant in that case "sought to avoid class certification by alleging that the
absent plaintiffs would not be adequately represented").
109. See Carter, supra note 19, at 126-27 (more broadly suggesting that
"the defense attorney, with whom the enforcement responsibility for most of
Rule 23's provisions principally lies, has no incentive to object since
certification and maintenance are needed to obtain res judicata on the class
as a whole").
110. Id. at 1133 (suggesting that particularly in large-scale, small-claim
litigation, because the class "attorneys are immune from monitoring by their
putative clients, they are guided primarily by their own self interest").
111. See Redish & Kastanek, supra note 107, at 549 (emphasizing the
importance of adverseness in group litigation).
112. Carter, supra note 109, at 1126-27.
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Additionally, one study examined whether courts have been
guarding the adequate representation requirement or have simply
been "rubber stamping the proposed representatives and class
counsel" and found that "the vast majority of courts conduct
virtually no gate-keeping function and approve class
representatives and class counsel with little or no analysis." 113
Although this study involved approval of adequate representation
rather than adequate notice, it seems unlikely that courts are
reviewing notice methods with any more scrutiny; as discussed
above, the trial courts referenced in both the Homeside Lending
and Lamarque simply listed the notice procedures employed and
stated without any further explanation that they were
adequate. 114
The lack of meaningful safeguards for the absentee class
members' right to receive adequate notice are highlighted when
one such member collaterally attacks a class action settlement or
judgment on the basis of inadequate notice. At this point, an
individual with the incentive to challenge the adequacy of notice
turns up and it becomes apparent that approved notice might
have been inadequate after all. However, because of the interests
in finality, efficiency, and full faith and credit, courts that adopt
the narrow scope of collateral attacks refuse to readdress the issue
of adequate notice, leaving the problem of inadequate notice
intact. In addition, even if a court subscribes to the more broad
scope of review and gets to the merits of the issue, under the lax
notice standards described above, it is entirely likely that the
notice would again be determined adequate.
Thus, although we have a meaningful standard that requires
notice and an opportunity to be heard, adequate representation,
and an opportunity to opt out, it is not being meaningfully
enforced. At the point when notice procedures are approved, no
party has the incentive to actually inform the class, and the people
that have the incentive are barred because they turn up after the
fact.
113. Robert H. Kionoff, The Judiciary's Flawed Application of Rule 23"s
'Adequacy of Representation" Requirement, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671, 673
(2004).
114. See 826 A.2d at 1018-19; 927 A.2d at 765-66.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROVIDING MORE MEANINGFUL
ENFORCEMENT OF REASONABLY IDENTIFIABLE CLASS MEMBERS' RIGHT
TO NOTICE
Having recognized the problem, the question then becomes
how is it remedied? A solution that would better safeguard the
due process rights of absentee class members will both raise the
bar that class counsel and defendant must meet before a court
approves a notice method and alter the current incentive
structure, so that at least one party is advocating on behalf of
absentee members' right to receive notice. This can be done in
part by establishing clearer and more stringent notice
requirements, and in part by not turning away absentee class
members who seek to challenge the adequacy of notice after the
fact.
One possible solution to the lack of due process safeguards
that has been suggested would require that class members
affirmatively opt in to be included in the class and thus to be
bound by the settlement or judgment. 115 The asserted benefits of
this approach, beyond affording greater due process protection to
class members, include limiting the class to those members that
have a real interest in pursuing the claim and guarding against
class actions pursued solely on the basis of an entrepreneurial
attorney's desire for substantial attorney fees. 116
In addition, in terms of altering incentives, requiring a class
member to affirmatively opt into a class would restore the
adversarial aspect that has been lacking in the context of notice
procedures. An opt in requirement would encourage class counsel
to get actual notice to as many class members as possible, in order
to ensure that the class is sufficiently large to be certified, 1 17 and,
in the case of small individual claims, that the amount of money
damages would be sufficient to make litigation worthwhile. 11 8
115. See, e.g., Stephen J. Safranek, Do Class Action Plaintiffs Lose Their
Constitutional Rights?, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 263 (1996); Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812
(absentee class member argued that due process requires absent class
plaintiffs to opt in).
116. See Safranek, supra note 115, at 266-67.
117. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(1) requires that the class be "so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable."
118. See Louis W. Hensler III, Class Counsel, Self-Interest and Other
People's Money, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 53, 62 (2004) (noting class members have
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Moreover, if it is clear that the numerosity requirement will be
satisfied, and if opting in were a due process requirement, the
defendants might help to ensure that as many class members as
possible to receive actual notice so that they might opt in and thus
be bound by the judgment.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has soundly
rejected an opt in requirement. 119  The Court wrote that
"[rlequiring a plaintiff to affirmatively request inclusion would
probably impede the prosecution of those class actions involving
an aggregation of small individual claims, where a large number
of claims are required to make it economical to bring suit. ' 120
Thus, those that would be happy to have their claims litigated on
their behalf would lose the benefit of the class action device
because enough class members either do not receive notice or do
not make the effort to opt in.
I propose two approaches which, if implemented together,
would help remedy the current lack of due process safeguards for
absent class members without making class actions impracticable
in the way the Supreme Court believes an opt in requirement
would. The first, and the less drastic of the two, is for courts to
implement more stringent standards for adequate notice
procedures. Secondly, in what would be a worthwhile overhaul of
the way in which courts have interpreted the notice requirement
in class actions, a per se rule should be adopted that provides that,
on collateral attack, the test to be applied for determining whether
notice was inadequate is whether actual notice was received.
First, there are several requirements courts can implement
that would provide more meaningful enforcement the goal of
individual and actual notice for as many class members as
possible. One simple and straightforward step, and one that
United States Supreme Court saw in Shutts, is to exclude class
members for which there is affirmative evidence that the notice
has not been received. In Shutts the Court noted that the 1,500
little incentive to opt out and thus, when the opt out mechanism is used, a
large class with correspondingly high potential damages is almost certain).
Assuming the incentive to affirmatively opt in would be the same for small
claims, the result would be the inverse: a small class with correspondingly
low potential damages.
119. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.
120. Id. at 812-13.
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class members for whom the notices were undeliverable were
excluded from the class. 121 Thus, if any notices are returned
undeliverable, the corresponding class members should be
excluded. In addition, absentee class members whose notices were
mailed too late to be received before the opt out deadline 122 should
be excluded unless the opt out period is extended. Besides
seeming logically necessary in order to give meaningful value to
the goal of actual notice and the absentee class members' due
process right to notice, requiring exclusion from the class in these
instances would incentivize defendants to ensure that mistakes of
address are corrected and that notices are timely sent.
Another more stringent standard courts should apply is a rule
that any class member that has litigation pending is "reasonably
identifiable" and thus entitled to individual notice. Individuals
who value their claims enough to have chosen to independently
pursue them should not be barred from doing so because they
failed to see a published notification, and it should take little
effort on the part of defendants to identify who is suing them. In
addition, because defendants have a particularly high interest in
binding these class members without actually notifying them,
courts could require that these class members opt in in order to be
included in the class. It would be important, however, that these
class members not be able to opt in after a certain deadline so that
they cannot join the class after having lost in their individual
suits. 123
The second approach courts should take is to adopt a black
and white rule that if an absent class member collaterally attacks
a judgment on the grounds of lack of notice, and if he or she can
prove that actual notice was not received, then the class member
should not be bound by the first suit. While this would admittedly
be a departure from current jurisprudence, 124 the benefits of this
121. Id. at 813.
122. See, e.g., Silber, 18 F.3d at 1450-52; DeJulius, 429 F.3d at 946.
123. See Robert H. Kionoff, Class Action Symposium: the Twentieth
Anniversary of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 74 UMKC L. REV. 487,
497 (2006) (noting the potential problem of class members "wait[ing] and
see[ing] how the case was going before deciding whether to opt out").
124. See, e.g., Silber, 18 F.3d at 1454 (stating that neither Mullane nor
Eisen requires actual notice and that Shutts did not change this); Carlough v.
Amchem Prod., 158 F.R.D 314, 325 (E.D.Pa. 1993) ("[rieceipt of actual notice
by all class members is required neither by Rule 23 nor the Constitution").
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standard of review would make its adoption worthwhile.
First, releasing class members who did not receive actual
notice from a binding decision clearly protects absentee class
members' due process rights. If the claim is monetarily
substantial then it would seem unfair that a plaintiff be denied
this interest without actual notice, and if the claim is monetarily
insubstantial then it would seem unlikely, as the Shutts court
pointed out, that an individual claim would be economically
practical or worthwhile. 125
Second, this approach would remove the temptation for
defendants to manipulate the effectiveness of notice procedures
that, if applied in good faith, would result in actual notice to class
members. Such manipulation was arguably the explanation for
defense counsel's actions in Lamarque. Not only would
defendants reap no benefit from failing to inform a class member
whom they know has an interest in independently pursuing his or
her claim, but they would also benefit from ensuring that
reasonably identifiable class members actually receive notice,
thereby binding such a class member to the class action court's
decision.
Third, enforcing an actual notice requirement on review
would relieve foreign courts facing a collateral attack by an
absentee class member from having to choose between second
guessing the class action court's decision and barring the plaintiff
from bringing his or her claim despite the fact that the notice due
was not received. Because a court applying the standards
recommended above would have approved notice based on the
assumption that those notices sent and not returned as
undeliverable were actually received, providing relief for those
that did not receive actual notice would be giving effect to the
intention of the class action court.
In addition, allowing class members to escape the binding
effect of a class action judgment or settlement if they did not
receive actual notice also does not raise the same "wait and see"
concerns as does an inadequate representation challenge126:
because the class members never received notice of the suit, they
could not have been waiting to see whether they were satisfied
125. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812-13.
126. See Klonoff, supra note 123, at 497.
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with outcome before raising their challenges.
Lastly, the more demanding and clearer standard would
provide class action defendants and would-be collateral attackers
with greater certainty as to the prospects of any challenge to the
adequacy of notice. Currently, defendants and potential plaintiffs
are faced with uncertainty as to whether a court reviewing any
potential collateral attack will adopt the broad or narrow scope of
review. Further, there are no clear standards of application
within each scope of review. Under the broad scope of review, the
court will examine the merits of the inadequacy of notice claim
using the same flexible standards the first court used, only this
time with hindsight. Under the narrow scope of review, a court
might summarily and deferentially find that adequate procedural
safeguards were in place in the class action suit as did the
Lamarque court, 127 or it could find that the notice issue had not
been fully litigated because it was not opposed, as did the
Homeside Lending court. 128  Simplifying the standard for a
successful collateral attack to one requiring a showing of lack of
actual notice removes many of these variables.
Thus, by adopting the more demanding standards for
establishing the adequacy of notice described above, and requiring
reviewing courts to enforce an actual notice requirement,
defendants have greater incentives to improve notice procedures,
and the due process rights of absentee class members are more
meaningfully protected. In addition, the debate over the scope of
review of a collateral attack on inadequacy of notice grounds
becomes moot, and absentee class members and defendants can
better evaluate the prospects of a collateral attack on inadequate
notice grounds.
CONCLUSION
The current standards for evaluating whether notice to
absentee class members is adequate do not protect the interest of
class members in receiving notice of the adjudication of their
rights. Neither class counsel nor defendants have any incentive to
improve notice programs beyond what courts have been willing to
approve. To solve this problem, courts must implement more
127. See 927 A.2d at 765-66.
128. See 826 A.2d at 1018-19.
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demanding requirements for establishing adequate notice in order
to better safeguard class members' right to notice and to
recalibrate incentives so that notice truly will be the best
practicable. In order to reinforce these safeguards, to add
additional incentive for improving notice, and to make more
consistent the standard for reviewing a collateral attack on the
adequacy of notice, a standard requiring actual notice to every
reasonably identifiable class member should be adopted. These
measures would help to ensure that what was meant to be a
meaningful standard is more meaningfully enforced.
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